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FRANKLIN F. RUSSELL*

Dual Nationality in PracticeSome Bizarre Results
Americans encounter the dual nationality problem in grade school while
studying the War of 1812. We are taught that the proximate cause of the
war was the unpleasant habit of the British of impressing ("Shanghai-ing"
in modern naval parlance) into the British navy, American citizens who
formerly had been British subjects, but had become naturalized here.
Although American citizens under American law, they remained British
subjects under British law.
To the protests of our State Department, the British Foreign Office
replied loftily, "Nemo potest patriam exudere," evidencing thereby the
occasional value, in public service in those days, of a sound classical
education. "No one can shed his nationality" is a fair equivalent, and
"Once an Englishman, always an Englishman" expresses the idea in
non-legal terms.
There was thus an irreconcilable conflict between the "doctrine of
indelible allegiance" of the British, and the American policy of liberal
naturalization. Great Britain did not abandon its views on expatriation until
1870, two years after our Fourteenth Amendment conferred American
nationality ("citizenship") upon all persons born in the United States, if
subject to our jurisdiction.
"Naturalization," to the American layman, suggests a court proceeding,
resulting in an immigrant surrendering his former allegiance and
nationality, and becoming an American citizen. Technically, it is defined as
"the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any
means whatsoever." 1 Text-writers call this "Derivative Acquisition of Na*Counsel, Shevlin & Siegfried, New York City; graduate of New York University, B.A.
cum laude; Bachelor of Civil Law, Oxford University (Rhodes scholar, New York State);
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1962-1967; Owen D. Young Professor of International Law, St. Lawrence University,
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tionality," as distinguished from "Original Acquisition of Nationality," that
is, through the circumstance of one's birth.
One method of derivative acquisition of nationality is by marriage, when
the parties are of different nationalities. Generally, the wife takes the
nationality of the husband. The United States, however, by the Cable Act
of September 22, 1922, provides, in respect of its own nationals, that no
change of nationality takes place upon marriage. 2 A few countries, in3
cluding Great Britain since 1949, have followed our lead.
Many nations claim the right to prohibit the naturalization of their
subjects, by judicial or administrative proceedings, in other countries.
They take the position that unless prior consent has been given to
expatriation by naturalization in the other country, the naturalization will
not be recognized by the country of origin. The United States, with its
large flow of immigration from early times, stands for freedom of naturalization.
Since some states look chiefly to the place of birth (jus soli) in
determining who are their nationals, others to nationality by descent (jus
sanguinis), and most states to both in varying degrees, dual nationality at
birth is not uncommon. Many immigrants remained nationals of their
homelands after coming to the United States. Their children, under the
principle ofjus sanguinis, were considered nationals of their father's native
country. Conflicts arising from dual nationality have occurred when the
dual national returned to his country of origin; for example, he has been
held liable for military service. Demands for payment of local estate or
inheritance taxes have been made in respect of decedents who were both
citizens of, and domiciled in, the United States.
The purpose of this article is to invite attention to some unusual
situations arising out of dual nationality. There are involved: marriage;
naturalization in America without the consent of the country of origin;
and claims by the treasury officials of foreign countries in respect of
decedents' estates of natural-born American citizens and domiciliaries,
whose property at death was situated wholly in the United States.
Some situations described herein have been corrected in whole or in
part. Others may be mitigated by treaties still to be negotiated. In one case,
the only advice which can be given to the client is to stay out of the
2

Married Women, United States, September 22, 1922 c.41 1,42 Stat.1021.
The British Nationality Act of 1948, which came into effect on the 1st January 1949,
accepted for the first time, the status of dual citizenship by naturalization. From then on a
British woman did not lose her British citizenship on marriage unless she chose formally to
renounce it, nor, on the other hand, did an alien woman who married a United Kingdom
citizen automatically acquire his citizenship. See British Nationality, by J. Meryn Jones
(1956).
3
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particular country, and to avoid use of its air lines and steamship lines,
until our State Department can assure our citizens that they will not be
molested, should they visit the land of their ancestors.
Marriage Cases
I. As stated above, the United States Cable Act of 1922 changed the
general rule that a wife takes the nationality of the husband. An American
girl marries a Frenchman after September 22, 1922; in American law, she
remains American; but in French law she becomes French. Conversely,
her brother (an American citizen) marries a French girl. Under French law,
she becomes an American; under American law, she remains French. In
respect of nationality, the Cable Act has achieved the intriguing paradox of
"double or nothing."
Interesting possibilities could arise if the French wife of a post-Cable
marriage should suddenly find herself in need of diplomatic or consular
assistance in a third country; the Americans would refer her to the French,
who, in turn, would refer her back to the Americans. This situation
resembles the renvoi problem, which so fascinates students of conflict of
laws. This back-and-forth shuttling has been called "lawn tennis applied to
4
law."
2. New York newspapers had a field day soon after the Cable Act went
into effect, thanks to an assist from the quota system of the immigration
law. An American man went abroad to marry an alien bride. They returned
to New York from their honeymoon about December 29th. The
sympathetic, but unrelenting, immigration authorities told the wife that she
could not be admitted because she was not an American citizen, and the
quota for her country for that year had already been filled. In this particular
case, no great harm was done. The pair went to Canada for a few days,
returned to New York and were promptly admitted.
This situation does not arise today, because of a system of preferences,
non-quota immigrants, etc. The large number of marriages of American
service men to foreign girls required a change. Consider, too, the amusing
complications, based on fact, set forth in I Was a Male War-Bride, in
which a French army lieutenant married an American WAC officer in
France, and wanted to accompany his wife to New York on an American
army transport, and to be admitted for permanent residence on arrival.
Certainly, no aspiration could be more modest, more reasonable or more
orthodox than to bring one's own spouse into one's own home in one's own
country for permanent residence therein.
4
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3. At the time of the passage of the Cable Act in 1922, the present
writer, along with many others, thought that serious complications would
arise out of the position taken by the United States; i.e., that no change in
nationality occurs when a marriage takes place between parties of different
nationalities. As of 1922, the American position was, in effect, "We are
right, and the rest of the world is wrong."
A different point of view became apparent very vividly to the American
Army of Occupation in Austria in 1945. A severe food shortage caused the
Austrian Government to propose deporting aliens in order to feed its own
nationals adequately. Austria followed the old rule that a wife took her
husband's nationality. Many Austrian girls had married Germans, and
many were war widows with young children. Hitler had abolished Austrian
nationality by the 1938 Anschluss, and the restoration of a separate Austrian citizenship was a primary goal for the Austrians in late 1945. Many
such women had never been in Germany, and had no connections
there-in many cases not even relatives of their husbands. The widows
were allowed to stay in Austria, notwithstanding legalistic arguments that
they were Germans and hence aliens. 5
4. Another marriage situation of a different nature arose out of the
application of a rule of Greek law that a marriage between two members of
the Greek Orthodox Church must be celebrated by a priest of that Church
in order to be valid. The question arose in connection with a demand by
the Greek Treasury that a beneficiary on intestacy of a decedent, whose
estate was being administered in New York, pay a tax on the inheritance
which she had received.
Practically all of the property owned by the decedent was located in
New York, except for shares of stock in a Central American corporation,
the certificates of which were located in the Central American country.
The beneficiary had been married to the decedent in the United States by a
civil ceremony, which was valid in all American states. Both were Greek
Orthodox communicants.
The attitude of the Greek Government was that since the marriage was
not valid under Greek law, the status of lawful wife (or widow) was denied
her. The importance of being demoted from the position of a wife-widow to
that of a complete stranger assumed financial significance, because Greece,
5
By Section 2 Paragraph I of Public Law #59, dated July 10, 1945, regarding transfer to
Austrian Nationality (Staatsbuergerschaftsueberleitungsgesetz), persons who had been continually domiciled in Austria since January 1st, 1915, could acquire Austrian citizenship by
declaration. For a discussion of the effect of the 1938 Anschluss on an Austrian citizen, and
also the necessity of considering "the accepted rules and practices under international law" in
determining who are "citizens" of a foreign nation, see U.S. ex rel Schwartzkopf v. Uhl, 137
F.2d 898 (C.A. 2-1943).
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like other jurisdictions, has various classes or categories of beneficiaries,
taxed in proportion to their relationship to the decedent. A stranger is
taxed much more heavily than a widow.
The grounds upon which Greece claimed jurisdiction over the estate
involved another question-the necessity, in Greek law, of the consent of
the Greek Government to renounce Greek nationality when an immigrant
applies for naturalization. Decedent was a native-born Greek who had
emigrated to America. No such consent was given by Greece, and, in
Greek eyes, the decedent remained a Greek national, whose estate was
liable for Greek death duties.
5. In the autumn of 1963, New York City newspapers had another field
day on a Greek-American dual nationality problem, arising out of the
refusal of the Greek Government to release from his prior Greek nationality, a Greek who had emigrated to the United States, where he became
naturalized in 1919, after service in the American army in World War I.
He died in 1955, unmarried, domiciled in Kings County, New York,
leaving movable property (bank accounts in New York banks, securities of
New York corporations) all located in New York City, none in Greece. He
left a will, which was admitted to probate; all debts and taxes paid, and
distribution made. One of his beneficiaries was his niece, Maria, who was a
native-born American citizen. She was married to a native-born Greek,
who had been naturalized in the United States before his marriage. He too
had not obtained the consent of the Greek Government to naturalization
proceedings in America. Maria's share, after deduction for her proportion
of taxes, amounted to about $4,500 which she received in 1957.
Six years later, in 1963, Maria took a trip to Greece. After a two-month
sojourn in the land of her forebears, she arrived at Athens to board her
plane for New York. Her name was called out, and she was escorted to an
office, where she was informed that the Greek Government had a claim
against her for about $3,300 for a Greek inheritance tax on the $4,500 she
had received from the New York estate of her uncle. She was told that she
could not leave Greece until she either paid the tax demanded, or posted a
bond to do so. The plane left without her. She was not imprisoned, because
Greek law does not permit a woman to be put in jail for debt.
A telegram to our State Department elicited the response (which, under
the circumstances, might be characterized, not uncharitably, as "Delphic")
that the Department was "already informed of the matter" and was "reviewing appropriate action." Ultimately, over a month later, she was permitted to leave Greece without paying the tax demanded.
A Greek-United States Double Taxation Treaty regarding Estates of
Deceased Persons entered into force December 30, 1953. It provides for
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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certain abatements, exemptions, deductions and credits (except the Marital
Deduction provided by the United States Revenue Act of 1948) in order to
prevent double taxation. 6 The words used in the treaty are "citizen or
7
subject" of the contracting parties (Art. V).
The claim of Greece was based on the two admitted facts that decedent
had not obtained permission of Greece to become an American naturalized
citizen, and a similar claim that Maria's husband likewise had not received
similar Greek permission for naturalization, and hence remained Greek.
Therefore his wife, Maria, was also Greek. Therefore, the Greek tax
bureau contended, Greece had jurisdiction over both the decedent's estate
and over the beneficiary.8
See Rogers, Secretary of State v. Bellei, Supreme Court of the United

States, October Term, 1969, No. 179, argued January 15, 1970. The issue
is the constitutionality of Section 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, providing that a person born abroad of one American
and one foreign parent loses his citizenship, unless he resides in the United
States for five continuous years between the ages of fourteen and
twenty-eight. On his twenty-third birthday, the plaintiff was informed that
he had lost his United States citizenship by virtue of Section 301(b). He
had been born of an American mother and an Italian father in Italy, and so
acquired American citizenship by virtue of Section 1993 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended by Section 1 of the Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797.
He also acquired Italian citizenship at time of birth. He had lived most of
his life in Italy. He claims that Section 301 (b), by providing for involuntary
expatriation, violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, by the reasoning in Schneider v. Rusk, 337 U.S. 163 (1963) and Afroyim v.Rusk, 387

U.S. 253 (1967), and likewise violates the procedural safeguards of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by stripping citizenship automatically without
prior judicial or administrative safeguards, on the analogy of Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). It was also urged that Section
30 1(b) violates the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it
is unreasonable, imposes a serious deprivation of liberty, and serves no
rational public policy in the changed circumstances of today. A three-judge
District Court granted a motion for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the government, which appealed. The Association of American Wives of
Europeans, and the American Bar Association (through its Section of
International and Comparative Law) filed briefs as amici curiae.
6

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2901.
71bid. Art. V. pp. 10- 11.
8
For further details, see a most interesting article in the BROOKLYN BARRISTER
Vol. 15 No. 2, November 1963, pp. 55-60, entitled The Greeks Had a Tax For It, by Gladys
M. Dorman, the attorney for the beneficiary.
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The Supreme Court had not handed down its decision at the time this
issue went to press.
Conclusion
Nationality is a legal concept both of municipal law and of international
law. The Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, April 12,
1930, provides: "Art. 1. It is for each state to determine under its own law
who are nationals. This law shall be recognized by other states in so far
as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and
the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality. Art. 2.
Any questiop as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in accordance with the law of that state."9
The reply of the United States on March 16, 1929, to the inquiries of the
Preparatory Committee for the Hague Codification Conference, stated:
"There are certain grounds generally recognized by civilized States upon
which a State may properly clothe individuals with its nationality at or after
birth but ...no State is free to extend the application of its laws of
nationality in such a way as to reach out and claim the allegiance of
whomsoever it pleases. The scope of municipal laws governing nationality
must be regarded as limited by consideration of the rights and obligations
of individuals and of other States... The Government of the United States
has taken the position that, as a general rule, no person should have the
nationality of a foreign country forced upon him after birth without his
consent, express or implied."' 10
In Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco," Great Britain
objected to the application to British subjects of decrees issued by French,
Tunisian and Moroccan authorities regarding the nationality of certain
persons born in Tunis and in Morocco (French Zone), both French protectorates. Great Britain brought the ensuing controversy with France
before the Council of the League of Nations. There, France contended that
the League lacked jurisdiction, since nationality was a matter which by
international law was solely within domestic jurisdiction. The Council
requested The Permanent Court of International Justice to give it an
advisory opinion on the question whether nationality is, by international
law, solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction, within Art. 15, par. 8 of the
Covenant. The French text used "exclusive" for "solely."
The Court answered in the negative, saying ... In a matter which, like
95 Hudson, International Legislation 359 (1936).
10
League of Nations Doc. 1929. V.I. at 145-146. See Bishop, International Law-Cases
and Materials (1962) p. 410.
"Per. Ct. of Int'l Jus., Advisory Opinions, Feb. 7, 1923 Ser. B No. 4.
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that of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the
right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations
which it may have undertaken towards other States. In such a case,
jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is limited by
rules of international law." Compare the language in United States ex. rel
Schwartzkopf v. Uh/12 where the issue was whether relator was an "alien
enemy" within the statutory definition, i.e., whether he was a "native,
citizen, denizen or subject" of Germany, because he was an Austrian
citizen on March 13, 1938, the date of the Anschluss: "In determining who
are 'citizens' of a foreign nation, our courts must consider not only the
municipal law of the foreign nation but also the accepted rules and practices under international law."
Dual nationality will be with us as long as some states look chiefly to the
place of birth (jus soli), and others to descent (jus sanguinis). Also, we shall
have it as long as some states do, and some do not, require their permission
for their nationals to become naturalized elsewhere; and as long as some
states do, and some do not, permit an automatic change of nationality by
marriage.
For decades American states have sought to tax decedents' estates on
various theories of domicile, situs of property, situs of the corporation
whose securities are involved, etc. Reciprocal tax legislation has eased
possibilities of double taxation. Our government has many treaties in force
with many nations, designed to prevent double taxation of incomes and
13
inheritances.
Perhaps the doctrine of "dominant nationality" can be developed, if one
nationality cannot be eliminated. 14 An obvious analogy is the development in the field of private international law 15 of applying to the solution
of the problem of the foreign tort, the law of the place with which the
plaintiff has the most contacts, instead of a double test of the act com16
plained of being actionable by the law of the place where committed.
An interesting argument has been made to the effect that Art. 15 of the
12

See Uhl case, Note 5, supra.
'3See current tax services for details of state statutes.
4
1 For the doctrine of "dominant nationality", see Claim of James Lewis Drummond, 12
Knapp P.C. Reports, 295, 12 Eng. Rep. 492; also U.S. ex rel Florence Strunsky Merge v.
Italian
Republic, Italian Conciliation Commission, 1955; Bishop, op. cit. 418, 423-424.
15 Professor Dicey, the author of what is probably the best-known text-book on Conflict
of Laws, used to tell his students (including the present writer) that he personally preferred
"Private International Law" to "Conflict of Laws", but he was overruled by his publishers.
16
For a recent article on conflict of laws, with special reference to torts, see Judge
Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Brooklyn Law Review 10 (Fall, 1969), by Professor
Hans W. Baade, of Duke Univeristy. See also The Foreign Torts Act: Look Before You
Leap, 20 Toronto L.J. 81 (1970), by Professor J. A. Clarence Smith, Faculty of Law,
University of Manitoba.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17 contemplates that a person
should have only one nationality at any given time; if a person who is at
birth subject to the nationality claims of two or more countries, the right to
a single nationality asserted in Par. 1 of Art. 15 seems clearly to imply an
obligation on all but one of the states to give up their claims.
Perhaps we may put some hope in the Commission of Human Rights of
the Council of Europe. It is regrettable that Greece ceased to be a member
last December. Perhaps Greece will someday again become a member. It
has been suggested by Professor Fawcett of Oxford that the Court of
Human Rights may create a new body of jurisprudence in this field. 18
We can encourage our State Department to negotiate the necessary
treaties to avoid most, or some, of the difficulties mentioned above. Meantime, while searching for solutions, we might profitably, for a guideline,
follow the famous, historic formula, enunciated by the late Mayor Fiorello
La Guardia, for living in what has euphemistically been dubbed "Fun
City" by his current successor: -Patience and Fortitude.

17

W.L. Griffin, The Right to a Single Nationality, 40 Temple L. Rev. 57, Fall 1966.
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, by J.G.S. Fawcett, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969.
t8
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